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 THERE ARE NO PENALTY DEFAULT RULES IN 
CONTRACT LAW 
ERIC A. POSNER* 
ABSTRACT 
 In an influential article, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner introduced the 
concept of the “penalty default rule,” a rule that fills a gap in an incom-
plete contract with a term that would not be chosen by a majority of par-
ties similarly situated to the parties to the contract in question. Ayres and 
Gertner argued that such a rule might be efficient in a model in which 
contracting parties have asymmetric information. However, Ayres and 
Gertner did not provide any persuasive examples of penalty default rules; 
their best example is the Hadley rule, but this rule is probably not a pen-
alty default rule. It turns out that there are no plausible examples of pen-
alty default rules that solve the information asymmetry problem identi-
fied by Ayres and Gertner. The penalty default rule is a theoretical curios-
ity that has no existence in contract doctrine. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION  
 Ayres and Gertner’s influential article, Filling Gaps in Incom-
plete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules,1 introduced 
the concept of the “penalty default rule,” which is a rule that fills a 
gap in a contract with a term that would not be chosen by a majority 
of parties similarly situated. The purpose of penalty default rules, 
Ayres and Gertner argued, is to force parties to reveal private infor-
mation, which enables their counterparts to perform more efficiently 
than they would if left uninformed.2 
 At the time Ayres and Gertner wrote their article, many law-and-
economics scholars believed that default rules should reflect the 
preferences of a majority of similarly situated parties.3 Ayres and 
Gertner showed that this view is not necessarily correct if parties 
have private information when they bargain with each other prior to 
entering a contract. If they do, and if various other assumptions hold, 
then penalty rather than majoritarian default rules are optimal.4 Es-
tablishing this normative claim was the main purpose of their article, 
and it is not my goal here to quarrel with it.5 
 Ayres and Gertner also made a positive claim: they argued that 
many default rules are, in fact, penalty default rules. Their central 
example was the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, a case which held that 
a carrier was not required to pay damages for losses that were an un-
foreseeable consequence of his breach. They also cited the “zero 
quantity” default rule in U.C.C. section 2-201 and a handful of other 
doctrines. 
                                                                                                                      
 1. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
 2. Id. at 91. 
 3. Although, several scholars had identified the information-forcing benefits of non-
majoritarian default rules such as Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. 
Div.), the case that was the focus of Ayres and Gertner’s article. See Ian Ayres & Robert 
Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 
YALE L.J. 729, 735 n.24 (1992). Earlier papers with this insight include Charles J. Goetz & 
Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 
1261, 1299-1300 (1980), and John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of 
Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972). 
 4. A similar argument was made roughly contemporaneously by Bebchuk and Shavell.  
See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach 
of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991). 
 5. Nor do I have any disagreement with those who have used the penalty default 
idea to investigate similar phenomena in other areas of the law such as statutory interpre-
tation, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2162 (2002), or with those who have developed new justifications for penalty default 
rules such as paternalism. E.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behav-
ioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 
(2003); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymo-
ron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). 
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 However, on closer inspection, none of the examples they provide 
in their original or subsequent papers turn out to be a clear penalty 
default rule. The Hadley rule is probably not a penalty default rule 
and, in any event, is certainly not a clear example of one. The zero-
quantity default rule is not a default rule but an element of a legal 
formality. The other examples in the Ayres and Gertner article are 
not existing legal rules at all, but proposals for legal change. Rules 
cited by Ayres in subsequent scholarship as examples of penalty de-
fault rules are not default rules but instead are contract formation 
rules or interpretive presumptions. Nor have other scholars identi-
fied clear examples of a penalty default rule. And, in my own re-
search, I have been unable to find a clear example of a penalty de-
fault rule or an example of an authoritative legal decisionmaker, 
such as a court or legislature endorsing a penalty default rule for 
reasons related to the factors identified in Ayres and Gertner’s 
model. All of this suggests that there is no such thing as a penalty 
default rule; penalty default rules simply do not exist or are not a 
distinctive doctrinal category. 
 Part II of this Article recapitulates Ayres and Gertner’s Hadley 
analysis. Part III looks at the doctrine. The Conclusion speculates 
about why there are no penalty default rules in contract law and 
whether it matters. 
II.   ANALYSIS 
A.   Preliminaries 
 Default rules are rules that, in Ayres’ succinct formulation, “gov-
ern in the absence of contrary agreement.”6 As I will discuss pres-
ently, there is confusion in the literature about what rules count as 
default rules and what rules belong to other categories. To clarify 
these issues, I will use the following framework—Imagine that a 
party claims breach of contract, and seeks damages. The court must 
(1) determine whether contract formalities are satisfied; (2) if so, de-
termine whether there was real consent (not fraud, duress, mistake); 
(3) if so, determine what the contract says; (4) if there is a gap (that 
is, if the contract does not address the contingency that caused the 
dispute), apply a default rule; and (5) if an explicit or implied term 
was violated, award a remedy.   
 The rules that are applied at each conceptual stage have different 
functions and effects. In step 1, courts apply contract formation rules 
such as the offer/acceptance doctrines, the consideration doctrine, 
and the statute of frauds. In step 2, courts apply rules that determine 
                                                                                                                      
 6. Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete Contracts, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 585, 585 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
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whether the parties consented, such as rules governing fraud, duress, 
and mistake. In step 3, courts apply rules of interpretation, including 
interpretive canons and the parol evidence rule. In step 4, courts ap-
ply default rules. In step 5, courts award damages or other remedies.7 
Thus, the focus of this Article is step 4. 
 Arguably, interpretive rules are analytically the same as default 
rules. Often contracts have a term that can be reasonably interpreted 
in multiple ways. One normally says that courts resolve ambiguities 
by applying interpretive presumptions, but one might with equal ac-
curacy say that ambiguities exist because parties fail to anticipate 
that the term will have more than one possible meaning, that there-
fore such contracts involve a “gap” where one would otherwise find a 
definition that eliminates the ambiguity, and that courts fill the gap 
using a default rule. Although I will generally treat interpretive pre-
sumptions as their own category, in Part II.D, I address the argu-
ment that they are identical to default rules and conclude that even 
if they are default rules, they are not penalty default rules. 
 Because one of my arguments will be that doctrines that are fre-
quently identified as default rules are not default rules at all, I want 
to emphasize here that I am not defining the category out of exis-
tence; there are many real default rules. The obvious marker is the 
“unless otherwise agreed” phrase, which is almost always attached to 
a default rule but never to other types of rules such as legal formali-
ties and contract formation rules. Here are a few random examples 
from the U.C.C.: “reasonable price” if the price term is left open, “best 
efforts” in exclusive dealing contracts unless otherwise agreed, deliv-
ery in single lot unless otherwise agreed, delivery at seller’s place of 
business unless otherwise agreed, reasonable time for delivery if de-
livery time left open, payment due at time and place of delivery 
unless otherwise agreed, assortment of goods is at buyer’s option 
unless otherwise agreed, merchant sellers warrant that goods are 
free of claims of third parties unless otherwise agreed, implied war-
ranty of merchantability unless excluded or modified, and implied 
warranty of fitness unless excluded or modified.8 Indeed, virtually 
every section of part 3 of article 2 contains one or more default rules. 
 By contrast, legal formalities (step 1), such as the statute of 
frauds, cannot be avoided by agreement, nor can contract formation 
rules (step 2: offer/acceptance, fraud) or interpretation rules (step 3). 
In my schema, remedial rules (step 5) simply implement default 
                                                                                                                      
 7. As is standard in the law-and-economics literature, I treat remedial rules like ex-
pectation damages and the Hadley rule as a default rule (step 4); in which case step 5 
should be interpreted as the court, in essence, enjoining the defendant to carry out the im-
plicit term (say, expectation damages) created by a default rule in step 4, if there is no ex-
plicit liquidated damages clause identified in step 3. 
 8. U.C.C. §§ 2-305, -306(2), -307, -308, -309, -310(a), -311(2), -312(3), -314, -315 (2005). 
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rules that are used to fill gaps; otherwise, they may be immutable 
rules (like the penalty doctrine and restrictions on injunctions). 
 Ayres and Gertner’s model applies to step 4, the application of de-
fault rules. They say little about step 3, the stage at which courts de-
termine whether there is a gap. I will say more about this step later. 
For now, let us focus on default rules and Ayres and Gertner’s chief 
example of a penalty default rule, the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale. 
B.   Full Information 
 In Hadley v. Baxendale, a miller hired a carrier to transport a 
crankshaft. The carrier failed to deliver the crankshaft on time. The 
miller was unable to operate his mill and lost profits—that is, in-
curred consequential losses. The contract itself did not have a term 
that said what would happen if the crankshaft was delivered late—
for example, whether the carrier should pay damages equal to the 
miller’s losses, should refund the fee, or something else. Thus, the 
contract had a gap. The Hadley rule is, in essence, that the carrier 
does not have to pay damages for the consequential losses unless 
they are foreseeable or communicated in advance. However, if the 
parties choose, they may agree in the contract that the carrier should 
pay the consequential losses. Thus, the default rule is foreseeable 
losses, but the parties can opt out of the default—that is, fill the 
gap—by agreeing to liability for consequential losses at the time that 
they enter the contract. 
 To understand Ayres and Gertner’s analysis of Hadley, one can best 
begin with a simpler version of the example that they analyze. Sup-
pose that at the time that the miller and the carrier enter their con-
tract, the miller values performance at some amount, V. The valuation 
can be low (VL) or high (VH); let us suppose that the valuation could be 
either with equal probability, and E(V) is the mean of VL and VH. The 
carrier can deliver using normal care at low cost (CL) or using a high 
level of care at high cost (CH). When the valuation is high, the optimal 
contract provides for high care; when the valuation is low, the optimal 
contract provides for low care. I assume full information. 
 Let t refer to transaction costs, which increase with the complex-
ity of the transaction. If the contract does not refer to care level, 
transaction costs are low; if it does, transaction costs are high. 
 If the default rule is that a carriage contract with a gap requires 
the low level of care, then the carrier will offer a simple contract 
(with a gap) to all low types. In the case of the high types, the carrier 
must choose between offering the simple contract (which will result 
in inefficient care but incur only low transaction costs) or the com-
plex contract (which will result in efficient care but also incur high 
transaction costs). 
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 If the default rule is that a carriage contract with a gap requires 
the high level of care, then the carrier will offer the simple contract 
to all high types. In the case of low types, the carrier must choose be-
tween offering the simple contract or the complex contract—again, 
depending on the transaction costs and precaution inefficiencies. 
 Assuming that the cost of transacting around is the same for low 
types and high types and that the inefficiency resulting from the 
failure to contract around is the same, then the optimal default rule 
will just be the rule that benefits a majority of the shippers. If most 
shippers are high types, then the default rule should be high precau-
tion; otherwise, the default rule should be low precaution. 
 Note that under this reasoning the majoritarian rule is not the 
best rule if—for whatever reason—the transaction costs for the ma-
jority type are much less than the transaction costs for the minority 
type. If, for example, there are five high types and four low types, but 
it costs high types $10 to opt out and it costs low types $20 to opt out, 
then the default rule should be the low-precaution rule preferred by 
the low types (assuming that both types prefer opting out to ineffi-
cient precautions). When the default rule is minoritarian, the major-
ity high types opt out at a cost of $50; when the default rule is ma-
joritarian, the minority low types opt out at a cost of $80. 
 The Hadley rule is a slightly more complicated version of my low-
precaution default rule. Rather than saying that the default is low 
precaution, it says that the shipper is entitled to damages that would 
be available to the low type. Failure to contract around the low-
precaution default rule and the Hadley rule would lead to the same 
result: a low level of care. The only difference is that the carrier that 
engaged in the low level of care would pay nothing under my default 
rule, whereas it would have to pay a low level of damages under the 
Hadley rule if the low level of precaution resulted in delay. 
 As noted above, scholars and courts typically say that a court ap-
plies a default rule only if there is a “gap” in the contract. This has led 
to some confusion because no contract can mention all possible events, 
and so how can a court tell whether a gap exists? The answer is inter-
pretation. A typical contract dispute is caused by some contingency—
the goods are destroyed in transit, a strike causes a delay, and so 
forth—and courts try to ascertain from the contract whether the par-
ties anticipated the contingency and explicitly allocated obligations in 
case that it occurred. If the contract mentions the contingency and ex-
plicitly allocates obligations (for example, “If the goods are destroyed 
in transit, then . . .”), then the court will not find a gap. If the contract 
is silent, then the court will find a gap. Many cases are ambiguous—
the contract may mention a broad class of events in which the contin-
gency may fall, for example—and in these cases courts apply general 
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interpretive canons to resolve the ambiguity. Having done so, the court 
might decide that a gap does or does not exist.9 
C.   Asymmetric Information Between Parties 
 Suppose there is asymmetric information. The carrier does not 
know the type of any particular customer but does know the distribu-
tion of types, and thus knows E(V). Again, optimally the carrier takes 
high care with high-type millers, and low care with low-type millers. 
But if the carrier does not know the type of miller, he will take aver-
age care, which is too low for high-type millers and too high for low-
type millers. Too much or too little care results in inefficiency. The 
inefficiency results because some parties with private information do 
not want to reveal it. They do not want to reveal their private infor-
mation because if they do, then they will have to pay a higher price, 
and this cost would exceed any benefit from the better level of care, 
because part of the cost is externalized on other parties. 
 The existence of such information externalities is not a sufficient 
reason to abandon majoritarian default rules. The carrier has an in-
centive to discover the types of the millers and an easy way to do so. 
The carrier has an incentive to discover the types because, if he 
knows the types of millers, then he can provide optimal care and the 
right price for optimal care, undercutting competitors who fail to do 
so. The carrier’s easy way to discover the types is to offer a menu of 
contracts—a high-price, high-care package, and a low-price, low-care 
package. If the default rule is majoritarian, then the carrier can save 
transaction costs by offering simple contracts to the majority type 
(say, low), and the complex contract—which specifies level of care—
for the high type. The default rule would specify low care because 
that is what a majority of the parties would want. 
 But conceivably the majoritarian default rule could be inferior to a 
penalty default rule. As in the full information case, one reason 
might be that it is sufficiently more expensive to write complex con-
                                                                                                                      
 9. One last point concerns the difference between what Ayres and Gertner called 
“tailored” and “untailored” defaults. To understand this distinction, note that a court might 
try to fill a gap with exactly the term the two parties to the dispute would have chosen if 
they had anticipated the dispute—in other words, the term that would have maximized the 
ex ante value of the contract to the two parties. Alternatively, a court might try to fill a gap 
with the term that most parties to similar contracts would have chosen. The difference be-
tween these approaches is that the first involves applying a standard and the second in-
volves applying a rule.  The economic analysis of this difference is identical to the general 
economic analysis of rules versus standards, one that involves trading off the decision costs 
incurred by courts and the efficiency loss resulting from applying a rule, which is always 
under- or overinclusive. I will assume (except where I state otherwise) that courts make 
decisions costlessly, in which case they should always fill gaps with the efficient terms (by 
applying standards) rather than by applying rules. In the present analysis, the efficient 
term is just whatever term that would have maximized the ex ante value of the contract to 
the two parties, independent of any effect on third parties. 
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tracts for high types than for low types. There is no reason to think 
this might be likely, but it is a theoretical possibility. 
 Another reason—the focus of Ayres and Gertner—is that the infor-
mation externality is (sufficiently) higher when the minority fails to con-
tract around than when the majority fails to contract around. Again, 
there is no particular reason to think this is so, but it is possible. 
 However, even if these outcomes are possible, they are not plausi-
ble. Real people do not divide into majority types and minority types; 
there is most likely a distribution of valuations best imagined as con-
tinuous, perhaps a truncated normal curve or a uniform distribution 
or something similar. If this is what the world looks like, then the 
majoritarian default rule will usually favor parties with the mean 
valuation, or valuations close to the mean, and disfavor parties with 
valuations at both tails. But there is nothing about being at a tail in 
a distribution that would make it likely that the parties have idio-
syncratically high transaction costs. 
 A further puzzle is why, as Ayres and Gertner seem to assume, 
majoritarian default rules and penalty default rules would coexist. 
The Hadley model is quite general and can be applied to any element 
of a contract—not just damages, but price, assignability, location of 
delivery, and so forth. There is no reason to think that information 
externalities pose more of a problem when parties omit a damages 
term than when parties omit a price or assignment term. Default 
rules of the kind found in the U.C.C. operate at a high level of gener-
ality and are not necessarily specific to any market.10 If Ayres and 
Gertner’s claim that the Hadley rule is a penalty default rule is cor-
rect, then one would expect all general default rules to be penalty de-
fault rules. If it is not correct, then one would expect all general de-
fault rules to be majoritarian default rules. 
 In sum, penalty default rules can be efficient relative to majori-
tarian default rules but only if one makes special assumptions. These 
assumptions strike me as implausible, but others may disagree. I 
have argued elsewhere that it would be difficult to show that these 
assumptions are valid, and I will not repeat that argument here.11  
                                                                                                                      
 10. As Scott and Schwartz note, the default “rules” in the U.C.C. seem a lot more like 
general standards than rules. They argue that such vague standards do not provide guid-
ance and are largely unhelpful. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and 
the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 601 (2003). I am not sure I agree with 
them, but the point here is that the various default rules in the U.C.C. apply to settings 
that seem, analytically, extremely similar, so it is hard to see why some would be penalty 
default rules and others would be majoritarian; given the similarity of the settings, one 
would expect all to belong to one type or all to belong to the other type. 
 11. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success 
or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003). Alan Schwartz has also long expressed skepticism 
about the ability of judges to choose optimal penalty default rules. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, 
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D.   Asymmetric Information Between Parties and Courts 
 Although the bulk of Ayres and Gertner’s original article provides 
a model of asymmetric information as between parties, they fre-
quently justify penalty defaults on the basis of an entirely different 
theory. This theory points out that courts are expensive and fallible 
institutions. If a contract has a gap, the courts must lumber into ac-
tion and try to determine the efficient term. But this is difficult and 
costly, so it would be better for parties to supply the term ex ante. To 
encourage parties to fill gaps at the time of contracting, courts should 
use penalty defaults. To avoid the bad outcomes created by penalty 
defaults for the majority of parties, this majority will fill gaps, thus 
simplifying the task for courts in most cases. By contrast, if people 
know that courts enforce majoritarian rules, they will feel less ur-
gency about specifying terms in their contracts, knowing that the 
courts may do a good enough (even if not perfect) job. 
 There are two ideas here, and they must be carefully distin-
guished. The first idea is that courts use legal doctrines to encourage 
contracting parties to provide sufficient detail in their contract, so 
that judicial interpretation in case of dispute will be guided by the ex 
ante intent of the parties, rather than by judicial guesswork. This 
idea was advanced by Lon Fuller, who argued that legal formalities 
serve this evidentiary function.12 
 The second idea is that penalty default rules (in addition to legal 
formalities) serve the function of encouraging parties to produce specific 
rather than vague contracts. Ayres and Gertner argue that penalty de-
fault rules encourage specificity by penalizing parties—giving them 
what they would not have wanted—who agree to vague contracts. 
 The first idea is plausible, but the second idea—that penalty de-
fault rules are the cure—is less persuasive. As to the diagnosis, there 
is no doubt that in a simple economic model, the parties have an in-
centive to externalize their costs on courts. One way of doing so may 
be to leave gaps in their contracts in the expectation that courts will 
fill them properly in case there is a dispute. 
 But the obvious remedy to this problem is to charge parties a fee 
for using the court system. They are charged modest fees already; 
perhaps the fees should be higher and especially for contract cases. 
Another obvious remedy—noted by Ayres and Gertner—is to refuse 
to enforce indefinite contracts. Traditionally (though less so today), 
courts would refuse to enforce indefinite contracts even if they were 
                                                                                                                      
The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 
416 (1993). 
 12. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941). 
572  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:563 
 
sufficiently definite to resolve the dispute in question.13 Thus, when 
parties draft a contract, they will fear leaving a gap lest a court re-
fuse to enforce the contract on grounds of indefiniteness—even if the 
gap has no bearing on the dispute before the court—so that which-
ever party would benefit from nonenforcement could simply fail to 
perform, eliminating the value of the contract.14 
 There is little reason to think that penalty default rules would be 
a remedy to the problem of parties leaving gaps as a way of external-
izing some of the cost of contracting onto courts. Penalty default 
rules penalize only the majority of parties for failing to fill a gap. 
However, the judicial externalization problem is not caused by the 
majority of parties; it is caused by all the parties—that is, both types, 
not just the majority type. By contrast, the indefiniteness rule ap-
plies to all parties, just as the judicial externalization problem re-
quires. So does the rule that requires parties to pay court costs. 
 The larger point is that Ayres and Gertner’s analysis of penalty 
default rules—their use of the Hadley model to identify the relevant 
variables for determining what the optimal penalty (and/or majori-
tarian) rules should be—is irrelevant to the question of how parties 
should be discouraged from externalizing costs on courts. The Hadley 
model concerned how parties should be discouraged from concealing 
information from each other or, put differently, from externalizing in-
formation costs on third (contracting) parties. Thus, the variables 
that are important in the Hadley model, such as the proportion of 
parties that belong to the high type or the low type, are not relevant 
to the analysis of how to discourage externalization of costs on 
courts. Thus, even if Ayres and Gertner’s analysis of Hadley is cor-
rect, there is no reason to think that limiting damages to foreseeable 
losses would result in the optimal amount of detail in the contract 
from the perspective of the judicial externalization problem. 
E.   Summary 
 Ayres and Gertner’s Hadley model shows that under certain pa-
rameters optimal default rules would not maximize the ex ante value 
of particular contracts but would penalize parties in order to encour-
age them to reveal information to each other. Drawing on Fuller’s dis-
cussion of legal formalities, Ayres and Gertner also argue that optimal 
default rules might also penalize parties so as to encourage them to 
write specific and complete contracts that can be easily interpreted 
                                                                                                                      
 13. The doctrine was overthrown by Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 
(N.Y. 1917). 
 14. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1641 (2003). 
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and enforced by courts. “Penalizing” parties means implying terms 
that would not maximize the ex ante value of their contracts. 
 It is worth noting that what distinguishes a penalty default rule 
and a majoritarian default rule is not that only penalty default rules 
are information-forcing. Both types of rule are information-forcing. A 
majoritarian rule is information-forcing because the minority types 
will contract out of it if transaction costs are low enough, revealing 
both their valuations and the valuations of the majority that does not 
opt out. The only difference between the two rules is that more par-
ties opt out of—or would prefer to opt out of—a penalty default rule 
than out of a majoritarian default rule, everything else held equal. 
Ayres and Gertner are correct that in imaginable cases greater opt-
ing out is more socially valuable than less opting out, despite the ex-
pense. Indeed, in the simplest case one does not need information ex-
ternalities to get this result: it is true in the very simple situation 
where, for whatever reason, it is extremely cheap for each member of 
the majority to opt out, whereas it is very expensive for each member 
of the minority to opt out. But it is hard to think of real-world exam-
ples where such differential costs hold and to believe that this is true 
at the general level at which default rules operate. 
 If I am right that penalty default rules do not promote efficiency 
under plausible assumptions about the world, then it is unlikely that 
penalty default rules would exist.15 But everyone seems to think they 
exist. Do they? I now turn to this empirical question. 
III.   EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 Evaluating Ayres and Gertner’s claim that penalty default rules 
exist turns out to be harder than it might appear. The problem is 
that many contract rules are ambiguous. To simplify matters, I will 
distinguish three types of tests: (1) there are default rules that are 
clearly not majoritarian; (2) there are default rules that are clearly 
not majoritarian, and that can plausibly be understood to incorporate 
the factors (cost of contracting around, distribution of types, informa-
tion externalities) identified by the Hadley model; and (3) there are 
default rules that are clearly not majoritarian and that have been in-
terpreted, explained, or defended by legal decisionmakers in a man-
ner consistent with the Hadley model.  The first test is weakest; the 
third is strongest. The first test would be satisfied by a nonmajori-
tarian rule that was not intended to force parties to reveal informa-
tion but reflected other concerns, such as fairness. As an aside, one 
might think that a good test would be the existence of default rules 
that force parties to reveal information; however, as I have already 
                                                                                                                      
 15. I confine my analysis to general rules of contract law and ignore family law, etc. 
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noted, because virtually all default rules force parties to reveal in-
formation, this test would not distinguish penalty and majoritarian 
default rules. 
 I will argue that there are, at best, one or two cases that ambigu-
ously satisfy the first test, and none that satisfies the second and third.16 
A.   Hadley 
 I start with the Hadley rule, which is Ayres and Gertner’s strong-
est example—perhaps their only plausible example. Still, it is not 
clear that the Hadley rule is a penalty default rule. There are two 
other possibilities: that it is majoritarian and that it is not majori-
tarian but that it does not reflect the factors in Ayres and Gertner’s 
model. 
 The usual reason for thinking that the Hadley rule is not a ma-
joritarian rule is that it is counter to the notion of efficient breach. 
The efficient breach theory says that contract damages should equal 
actual loss, so that the party tempted to breach will breach only if 
the cost of performance exceeds the lost value to the potential victim. 
On this view, the majoritarian damages default rule would be actual 
loss, for it would save the parties the transaction costs of specifying 
the efficient amount of damages in case of nonperformance. Since the 
Hadley rule excludes the unforeseeable portion of any loss, it is not 
majoritarian. 
 The problem with this view is that it oversimplifies the analysis of 
optimal damages rules. The decision to breach is just one of many de-
cisions the parties may make, and if damages for actual loss ensures 
that this decision is made optimally, it has more ambiguous effects 
on the numerous other decisions that parties must make—the deci-
sion whether to take precautions, to mitigate, and so forth.17 
 Indeed, one problem with expectation damages is that they force 
the breacher to provide insurance to the victim against whatever 
event causes the breach. It will rarely be the case that the carrier 
                                                                                                                      
 16. Proving a negative is difficult. For present purposes, it seems sufficient to focus on 
examples used by Ayres and Gertner (or Ayres, in his solely authored efforts) and a few 
other authors, and there may be penalty default rules lurking somewhere in the common 
law or the U.C.C. which I miss. I also ignore several putative examples of penalty default 
rules which are really proposals to change existing laws into penalty default rules; e.g., the 
discussion of Lefkowitz and the lost-profits puzzle. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 
104-06. 
 In a highly unsystematic survey of articles with the term “penalty default rule” appear-
ing somewhere within them, I found no cases where an author claims that a general rule of 
contract or commercial law is a penalty default rule (aside from the examples from Ayres 
and Gertner). Most of the articles either contain proposals or hypothetical examples, or in-
volve other areas of the law such as statutory interpretation, legal ethics, or patent law. 
 17. See Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Effi-
cient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988). 
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will be the cheaper insurer, and indeed, we observe that modern car-
riage contracts always limit liability—although the shipper may pur-
chase insurance from the carrier for an extra fee. Perhaps this insur-
ance is frequently purchased, but one suspects not.  Carriers have no 
competitive advantage in the insurance market. Indeed, carrier-
supplied insurance is likely in many cases to be inferior to self-
insurance. If this is right, then most parties would want liability lim-
ited to foreseeable loss; the Hadley rule is majoritarian.18 
 This conclusion is bolstered by the rule’s reference to foreseeabil-
ity. The carrier will not adjust its level of care in anticipation of un-
foreseeable losses—whether the term “unforeseeable” is taken in its 
literal sense or used to refer to remote contingencies—because the 
expected loss is either insensitive to, or only remotely related to, the 
level of care. Thus, within Ayres and Gertner’s Hadley model, there 
is no benefit—in terms of a higher level of precaution against higher 
losses—from holding the carrier liable for consequential losses. The 
losses covered by the Hadley rule are in this way the type of losses 
against which one might want to purchase insurance, but not the 
type of losses the carrier should internalize for the sake of efficient 
precaution. Again, there would be no reason for the parties to turn 
the carrier into an implicit insurance company, as would be the case 
if expectation damages, not limited by the Hadley rule, were the de-
fault. 
B.   Zero Quantity and Legal Formalities 
 Ayres and Gertner say that the U.C.C. supplies different default 
rules for price and quantity.19 If the parties fail to supply a price 
term, the U.C.C. says that the court should imply a “reasonable 
price,” which will usually be the market price at the time of deliv-
ery.20 If the parties fail to supply the quantity term, the U.C.C. says 
that the court should not enforce the contract.21 Ayres and Gertner 
interpret this provision as a “zero-quantity default.”22 The court im-
plies that the quantity will be zero and, also, though they do not say 
this, that the buyer has no obligation to pay anything. For Ayres and 
                                                                                                                      
 18. But cf. Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the 
Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1989). The ambiguity of the Hadley rule has been 
noted by many scholars, including Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. 
Baxendale, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1999), and Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining 
and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990). Ayres and 
Gertner seem to agree. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 91. 
 19. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1, at 95-96. 
 20. Id. at 95-96 & n.42. 
 21. Id. at 96 & n.43. 
 22. Id. at 96. 
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Gertner, the price default is plausibly a majoritarian rule and the 
quantity default is a penalty default rule.23 
 The reason that the zero-quantity default is a penalty default 
rule, Ayres and Gertner argue, is that it is clear that most parties 
who enter a contract would not agree to zero quantity, which would 
defeat the purpose of having a contract in the first place.24 The rea-
son for zero quantity is that “it is cheaper for the parties to establish 
the quantity term beforehand than for the courts to determine after 
the fact what the parties would have wanted.”25 
 The problem with this argument is that the zero-quantity default is 
not a default rule at all; it is a legal formality.26 The U.C.C. says as 
much: section 2-201 is entitled “Formal Requirements; Statute of 
Frauds.” The requirement that certain contracts be in writing is a 
classic formality, and all that the zero-quantity rule does is specify 
that quantity (as well as a signature and reference to goods) must be 
in the writing. According to the official comment, the drafters of the 
U.C.C. required a quantity term rather than a price term because 
market prices, catalogs, and price lists provide an objective way to 
prevent opportunism (for example, a claim by the seller that the price 
is higher than what the parties agreed to), whereas there is no similar 
objective check on claims that the asserted quantity is different from 
what the parties agreed to.27 By contrast, section 2-305, which is enti-
tled “Open Price Term” is located in a different part of the U.C.C., a 
part entitled “General Obligation and Construction of Contract.” Sec-
tion 2-305 is a default rule. Section 2-201 is not. And, as Ayres and 
Gertner agree,28 section 2-305 is a majoritarian default rule.29 
 Putting aside the drafters’ own understanding of what they were 
doing, we can see why section 2-201 is a legal formality by consider-
ing its purpose. Like all contract formalities, the purpose of the stat-
ute of frauds is to prevent people from fraudulently claiming that a 
contract exists.30 Formalities make such fraud more difficult by forc-
ing the fraudulent party not only to perjure himself in court but also 
to forge documents, which is riskier and more difficult than perjury. 
At the same time, formalities are not supposed to be so burdensome 
as to interfere with good faith contracting. Forcing parties to supply 
a quantity term (and, in fact, not the exact quantity, but a ceiling) 
would be a way of checking fraud without also inhibiting contracting 
                                                                                                                      
 23. Id. at 95-97. 
 24. Id. at 96. 
 25. Id. 
 26. This was pointed out in W. David Slawson, The Futile Search for Principles for 
Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 29, 37 (1993). 
 27. U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (2005). 
 28. Albeit with some qualifications. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 1. 
 29. See id. at 95 n.42. 
 30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 131 cmt. c (2005). 
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too much since parties will almost always have an idea of the quan-
tity involved. 
 One should also observe that the logic of section 2-201, as Ayres 
and Gertner describe it, does not follow their model, but Fuller’s 
older theory.31 As they describe it, section 2-201 does not force parties 
to reveal information to each other by penalizing one party if he or 
she does not; it forces parties to reveal information to courts by pe-
nalizing both parties if they do not. Ayres and Gertner think that 
parties should be forced to include a quantity term because the par-
ties can more easily reveal their optimal quantity to the court than 
the court can figure it out ex post. This might be true; but it is not re-
lated to Ayres and Gertner’s model, where parties have private in-
formation about their valuations vis-à-vis each other. 
 Legal formalities are not default rules—one cannot opt out of 
them or contract around them. Either one satisfies them or one does 
not have a contract, and they apply regardless of whether there is a 
gap somewhere in the contract. Default rules come into play only if 
formalities are satisfied and a contract exists. 
C.   Unilateral Mistake and Other Contract Formation Rules 
 Ayres and Gertner have invoked formation doctrines as examples 
of default rules. Consider this passage from a recent article: 
For example, section 153 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
allows a contractor who is unilaterally mistaken about a basic as-
sumption to void a contract if “the other party had reason to know 
of the mistake.” The default possibility of voidability is a penalty 
that the informed contractor can only avoid by revealing informa-
tion. Indeed, in a Hadley-like fact pattern, a carrier could argue 
that a basic assumption of its promise to perform or pay damages 
was the belief that the miller would only have foreseeably low 
damages. Any evidence that the miller knew that it had high dam-
ages, but failed to correct the carrier’s mistaken assumption, might 
be grounds for voiding the carrier’s duty to pay damages at all. A 
slightly expanded reading of the common law of mistake thus can 
be seen as a penalty default to induce knowledgeable contractors 
to correct the other side’s mistakes of law or fact.32 
This is a puzzling argument. The mistake doctrine is not normally 
thought of as a default rule because it does not fill a gap in an other-
wise valid contract; it results in the avoidance of the contract. In a 
classic mistake case, a contractor’s bid is much lower than the bids of 
competing contractors. The bid reflects a mistaken calculation, and 
                                                                                                                      
 31. See Fuller, supra note 12. 
 32. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1591, 1609-10 (1999) (footnotes omitted). 
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the party taking the bid has reason to know that the contractor’s low 
bid results from a mistake. If the offeree accepts the bid, the result-
ing contract would not have a gap—the price term is filled in. The 
problem with the contract is not that it lacks a price or has any other 
gap; it is that the price is “wrong.” The mistake doctrine does not fill 
a gap in an incomplete contract; it operates on precontractual behav-
ior, preventing the formation of a contract in the first place.33 
 In this way, the mistake doctrine is like doctrines against fraud as 
well and, indeed, like legal formalities, which require parties to re-
veal to each other whether they want the agreement to be legally en-
forceable. None of these doctrines force parties to reveal the type of 
information analyzed in Ayres and Gertner’s Hadley model—that is, 
the value that the promisee attaches to performance and the cost of 
performance for the promisor. Indeed, the unilateral mistake doc-
trine forces the promisee to reveal information to the promisor about 
the promisor’s cost, not the promisee’s valuation. 
 But suppose that the mistake doctrine is thought of as a default 
rule along the following lines. The contract does not have a term 
specifying the parties’ obligations if the contractor’s bid is based on a 
clerical error; courts apply a default rule that says that the parties 
have no obligations if such is the case. In other words, the default 
rule provides a certain term if a precontractual contingency—the 
clerical mistake—is not mentioned in the contract. It is worth em-
phasizing that it is not clear that this is an accurate statement be-
cause it is not clear that parties could contract out of this rule, but let 
us suppose that this is the case. Still, the mistake doctrine would 
surely be a majoritarian default rule, if it is a default rule at all. 
Given that clerical errors are difficult to avoid, that the party that 
receives the bid can easily detect a major clerical error by comparing 
the bidder’s price with the prices offered by other bidders and that 
the recipient of the bid need not rely on the bid given that other bids 
are submitted, it would make sense for the parties to agree in ad-
vance on a term that relieves the bidder of its obligation if a clerical 
error results in a price that is substantially higher than the next 
highest price. 
D.   Interpretive Presumptions 
 Another kind of rule is the interpretive presumption, like the con-
tra proferentem rule that a contract should be construed against its 
drafter. Ayres claims that this rule is a penalty default.34 Is it? 
                                                                                                                      
 33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153(b) (2005). 
 34. See Ayres, supra note 6, at 587; see also Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing To Dis-
agree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389. 
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 An initial but probably unimportant problem with the view that it 
is a penalty default is that the rule applies, at least formally, regard-
less of whether there is a gap in the contract. Interpretive presump-
tions operate at step 3, when the court must interpret the contract. 
Only if the court, applying interpretive rules, finds a gap at step 3, 
would it then move on to step 4 and fill the gap. 
 As an illustration, suppose that a contract involving a European 
party and an American party lists a price of “100” but does not say 
whether the price is in euros or in dollars. A court would (at step 3) re-
solve this ambiguity. It might apply the contra proferentem rule, the 
parol evidence rule, or something else. Once the ambiguity is resolved 
in one way or another, the court’s inquiry ends. There is no gap, as 
there would be if the parties had not stated the price in the contract. 
 Or as another illustration, suppose that a contract has an am-
biguous statement about whether the promisee can assign the con-
tract. At step 3, the court might interpret the ambiguous statement 
as an explicit term that forbids or permits assignment, or it might in-
terpret the ambiguous statement as meaningless or inapplicable (for 
example, parol evidence reveals that it applied to other kinds of as-
signment than the one in question in the dispute). In the latter case, 
the court finds a gap at step 3, so it can move on to step 4 and fill it 
in using the U.C.C.’s default rule which permits assignability.35 
 Nonetheless, one might plausibly argue that interpretive pre-
sumptions are analytically the same as default rules even if they are 
placed in a separate doctrinal category. An ambiguous term might be 
reinterpreted as a term that does not fully specify obligations. In the 
first illustration, one might say that the price term is ambiguous be-
cause the contract contains a gap—it does not say whether the price 
is denominated in euros or dollars. The court fills this gap by using a 
default rule that provides for the term that would benefit the party 
that did not draft the contract. 
 Even if this interpretation is correct, it does not establish that in-
terpretive presumptions like contra proferentem are penalty default 
rules. In any specific application of the rule, the term chosen by the 
court may or may not reflect the interests of the majority of the par-
ties. In the first illustration, there is no reason to think that a major-
ity of American-European contract parties would prefer the price to 
be in euros rather than dollars. Nor is there any reason to think that 
the term contrary to the drafter’s interests is the term that a minor-
ity (or majority) of contract parties would choose. 
 When we think again of Ayres and Gertner’s model, their assump-
tion was that (say) the buyer may belong to different types: a major-
                                                                                                                      
 35. U.C.C. § 2-210(3) cmt. 6 (2005). 
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ity type and a minority type. Now, stipulate that the sellers are iden-
tical. In this setting, a penalty default rule would provide the term 
preferred by the minority type. The contra proferentem rule provides 
the term preferred by the nondrafter. In Ayres and Gertner’s setup, 
the contra proferentem rule would be a penalty default rule with the 
functions they assign to penalty defaults only if the majority type 
happens to be the party that drafts the contract. But there is no rea-
son to believe this; more likely, the seller drafts the contract or the 
buyer (of either type) drafts the contract.36 Thus, the rule does not 
differentiate between types, as envisioned by the Ayres and Gertner 
model, so the rule does not cause one type to opt out while saving the 
other type transaction costs. There is a mismatch between the model 
and the function of the interpretive presumption. 
 Further, if we must think of interpretive presumptions as default 
rules, then surely they are majoritarian. The drafter has an advan-
tage: she can sneak in favorable language. But as a consequence, the 
drafter may have trouble persuading the nondrafter to consent to a 
contract. A natural solution to this problem is to agree that ambigui-
ties will be construed against the drafter. Similarly, sellers may have 
trouble persuading consumers to agree to contracts for complex 
products that they do not understand unless the consumers are as-
sured that ambiguities will be construed against the sellers. It is 
hard to imagine parties agreeing to the contrary rule—that ambigui-
ties will be resolved in favor of the drafter and against consumers 
and insureds. 
 None of this is to deny that interpretive presumptions like contra 
proferentem have information-forcing effects. As I have noted, ma-
joritarian as well as penalty default rules have these effects. The con-
tra proferentem rule, for example, might encourage the drafter to be 
more explicit and to provide more details about obligations. This may 
reduce the chance that the other party will misunderstand the con-
tract; it also may facilitate judicial interpretation of the contract. In-
terpretive presumptions that favor consumers and insureds encour-
age sellers and insurers to draft detailed and explicit contracts, 
which increases the chances that the less sophisticated party will 
understand her contractual obligations. But these effects are not the 
subject of Ayres and Gertner’s model. 
E.   Section 2-210 
 Ayres and Gertner cite section 2-210 in a discussion of penalty de-
fault rules, though it is not clear whether they claim it is an example 
of a penalty default rule or not.37 Nonetheless, I will discuss it, if only 
                                                                                                                      
 36. Of course, if only the high type is the drafter, the information problem is solved. 
 37. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 763-64. 
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to show that the majoritarian interpretation of this rule and rules 
like it is more straightforward and plausible than the alternative in-
terpretations. 
 Section 2-210(2)(a) says that a “party may perform [his] dut[y] 
through a delegate unless otherwise agreed or unless the other party 
has a substantial interest in having [his] original promisor perform 
or control the acts required by the contract.”38 The default thus has 
two parts: (1) delegation permitted if the identity of the original pro-
misor does not matter and (2) delegation not permitted if the identity 
of the original promisor does matter. As is always the case with a de-
fault rule, the parties can opt out and prohibit delegation in the first 
case, or permit it in the second. 
 The majoritarian explanation for this rule is simple and intuitive. 
For the promisor, the power to delegate has value, and thus he or she 
will normally want to have it. This power is valuable because it al-
lows the promisor to pay someone else to perform on his behalf, 
which he will want to do if he can find someone else who will do it for 
a low price or if he finds some better opportunity that conflicts with 
his initial promise. But delegation is undesirable for the promisee if 
the value of performance turns heavily on the unique abilities of the 
promisor and a normal damages remedy cannot fully compensate the 
promisee for the shortfall. Thus, one would normally expect delega-
tion to be permitted when the performance is fungible and not when 
the promisee cares about the identify of the promisor. 
 Ayres and Gertner note that this rule may force a promisee to re-
veal the extent to which he values the promisor’s performance, which 
is information the promisor may use to extract a higher price.39 To 
avoid paying the higher price, the promisee might refuse to reveal his 
interest and, thus, consent to an inefficient contract that permits 
delegation.40 But it is not clear what follows from this observation. 
Perhaps Ayres and Gertner’s point is that section 2-210 is not a pen-
alty rule, and for this reason may be objectionable. If so, then clearly 
section 2-210 must count as a majoritarian rule.  
F.   The Understandings of Legal Decisionmakers 
 I have said little about step 3, which asks whether the reasoning 
of legal decisionmakers reflects the considerations modeled by Ayres 
and Gertner. One way to apply this test is to look at the reasoning 
given by decisionmakers rather than at the doctrines themselves. 
                                                                                                                      
 38. U.C.C. § 2-210(2)(a) (2005). 
 39. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 3, at 763-64. 
 40. See id. at 765.  
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1.   The Uniform Commercial Code 
 The U.C.C., which is the source of many of Ayres and Gertner’s 
examples, was designed by its guiding light, Karl Llewellyn, to re-
flect existing business norms and customs.41 Llewellyn believed that 
the common law depended too heavily on formal doctrinal distinc-
tions that did not match business practice and, thus, forced parties to 
engage in unnecessary rituals to ensure that their agreements were 
enforced properly.42  In addition it forced courts to engage in needless 
gyrations in order to extract correct results from recalcitrant doc-
trine. Llewellyn thus used business practice as a guide, and either 
made the U.C.C.’s default rules reflect practice or else incorporated 
vague standards that would allow courts to do this ex post.43 
 This being so, it would be surprising if the U.C.C.’s default rules re-
flected nonmajoritarian preferences. They would, only if business 
norms and customs themselves cured the information asymmetries 
identified by Ayres and Gertner’s Hadley model. But this seems im-
plausible. Business practices become norms because, as the term sug-
gests, they are normal—most people engage in them. Most people en-
gage in them because they are jointly profit-maximizing. This is the 
standard majoritarian approach to default rules. The opposite view 
would hold that two parties to a contract engage in some practice in 
order to benefit a third party—and this behavior becomes routinized. 
2.   Some Recent Cases 
 Seven cases contain citations to Ayres and Gertner’s original article, 
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts. Four of these citations are not 
relevant to the current discussion,44 but three of them are interesting. 
 Harnischfeger Corporation v. Harbor Insurance Company45 in-
volved a dispute over the meaning of a clause in an excess insurance 
policy. The insured argued that the excess insurer’s liability would 
kick in when the insured (which self-insured for the primary amount) 
had paid out $3,000,000 in claims and legal fees.46  The insurer ar-
gued that its liability kicked in only after the insured had paid out 
                                                                                                                      
 41. Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn’s Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 546-47 (2000). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 553. 
 44. See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (1995); Coronet Ins. Co. v. GACC 
Holding Co., No. 90C07129, 1991 WL 172182 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 1991). Another case—
Moreau v. Harris County, 158 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1998)—confuses contract law and statu-
tory interpretation, holding that its interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act reflects 
a contract default rule. In Duncan v. Theratx, Inc., 775 A.2d 1019, 1021-22 & n.4 (Del. 
2001), the court uses the majoritarian approach, only noting the possibility of penalty de-
faults in a footnote. 
 45. 927 F.2d 974 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 46. Id. at 975. 
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$3,000,000 in claims only.47 The court held that the clause unambi-
guously favored the insurer’s interpretation and thus rejected the in-
sured’s invocation of the principle that ambiguities should be re-
solved against insurers.48 The court noted in passing, “Perhaps the 
interpretive principle [that ambiguities should be resolved against 
insurers] could be recast as one requiring the insurer to come forth 
with information in its possession but unknown to the insured,” cit-
ing the Ayres and Gertner article.49 But then it said, “Wisconsin has 
not suggested this understanding of its approach, perhaps because it 
doubts judicial ability to determine how much information is optimal 
. . . .”50 Thus, the court rejected the penalty default analysis. 
 American National Fire Insurance Company v. Kenealy51 was an-
other insurance dispute. The insurer had provided in a policy that 
changes in coverage of the insurance (for a yacht) were valid only if 
approved by the insurer.52 When the insureds sought to increase the 
geographic coverage of the insurance policy, the broker obtained this 
expansion but told them that the expanded coverage would continue 
for one year when in fact the insurer authorized the expansion for 
only a few months.53 The yacht sank after the expiration of the new 
coverage but before the one-year period expired.54 The insurer sought 
to avoid liability on the basis of the clause limiting coverage changes, 
but the court held in favor of the insureds because the broker was a 
proper agent with apparent authority to bind the insurer.55 
 The court rejected the insurer’s argument because the clause that 
conditioned changes on approval by the insurer did not say that the 
insurer could not provide such approval through its agents.56 Thus, 
the contract was silent on the issue of whether an agent could bind 
the insurer, and the question for the court was whether the default 
rule should put the burden on the insurer or the insured. The court 
noted that in some cases the insurer is in a better position to monitor 
the agent, and in other cases the insured is in a better position.57 It 
decided that the default should favor the insured—that is, the agent 
binds the insurer unless otherwise agreed—because otherwise insur-
ers may “strategically withhold[] information as to what authority 
                                                                                                                      
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 976. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. 72 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 52. Id. at 266. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 271. 
 56. Id. at 268. 
 57. Id. 
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the agent actually has, and whether the company is bound if an acci-
dent occurs.”58  
 Although the court cited Ayres and Gertner’s article,59 the court 
did not have any concerns about the insurer having private informa-
tion about its valuation. The court apparently thought that insureds 
would assume that the broker could bind the agent even if the law 
were otherwise. In effect, the court was aligning the law with the un-
informed expectations of insureds—perhaps because it believed that 
the insurer, by using the broker in the first place, was in part re-
sponsible for generating these expectations. It feared that if the de-
fault rule placed the burden on the insured, the insured would not 
realize that the broker’s statements were not binding until ratified 
by the insurer and, further, that the insurer would have no incentive 
to clarify the law in the contract.60 Whatever one thinks of this rea-
soning, it reflects traditional consumer protection ideas and is not an 
application of the Ayres and Gertner model. 
 Finally, in City of Burlington v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North 
America,61 the court had to decide whether an “all risk” insurance 
policy provided coverage only for damage caused by external events 
(such as storms) and not by “intrinsic” factors such as structural de-
fects in the property in question. Although it certified this question to 
a state supreme court rather than deciding it, the court argued in 
passing that a default rule that all risk policies covered intrinsic as 
well as extrinsic losses would be a penalty default rule.  
On this account, expanded coverage to the detriment of insurers in 
all-risk policies is justified since such expansions give insurers, 
who presumably have better knowledge of insurance laws than do 
insureds, a powerful incentive to insert explicit language into poli-
cies, thereby informing the insureds as to the precise scope of cov-
erage.62  
Although the court cited the Ayres and Gertner article,63 like the 
Kenealy court, it relied on a different theory—namely, that insureds 
do not understand their coverage, and that default rules should re-
flect the expectations of the insureds rather than the jointly optimal 
terms. 
 It should also be noted that the court does not explain why a de-
fault rule that stipulated expanded coverage would not be the majori-
tarian default. On the one hand, insurers might be reluctant to cover 
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 60. See id. at 269. 
 61. 332 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 62. Id. at 49. 
 63. Id. 
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intrinsic defects because of fears of moral hazard. On the other hand, 
insureds are unlikely to distinguish externally and internally caused 
losses—a loss is a loss—and be willing to pay for both. Indeed, the 
distinction between external and intrinsic losses is at best a rough 
and ready one: when a storm damages a structure, is the cause of the 
loss the “external” storm or the “internal” design problems that ren-
dered the structure unable to withstand the storm? Without knowing 
more about the market, one cannot say with any confidence that one 
version of the default rule or the other is majoritarian. But given 
that the Burlington court does not refer to private valuations, differ-
ential transaction costs by type, the proportion of types, and so forth, 
it could not have been applying the Ayres-Gertner model. 
G.   Summary 
 My survey of the law revealed no unambiguous penalty default 
rule in American contract law.64 One might argue that many of the 
ambiguous default rules are actually penalty default rules—that is, 
they reflect the preferences of a minority rather than of a majority. 
But it is clear that the self-understanding of courts is otherwise: 
courts almost always think of themselves as choosing the rule that a 
majority would want. In addition, courts never take into account fac-
tors relevant to the Ayres-Gertner model. Indeed, they rarely discuss 
the problem of private information that is identified by that model—
that individuals with high valuations will try to hide this informa-
tion—in the context of choosing or justifying default rules. Thus, if 
some default rules are not majoritarian, the most likely explana-
tion—putting aside the consumer protection defaults mentioned be-
low—is that courts or the drafters of the U.C.C. simply made a mis-
take about what the majority prefers. 
 Problems of private information appear in judicial discussions 
mainly in cases involving consumer protection. Here, courts worry 
that consumers (or insureds) do not understand the law, do not un-
derstand the terms of the contract that they sign, or do not properly 
value the product that they purchase. A few default rules seem to be 
intended to give the seller an incentive to explain the law to the con-
sumer, or to provide explicit terms in the contract, but the justifica-
tion is mainly the traditional consumer protection justification, ac-
cording to which consumers are easily manipulated by sellers, not 
the Ayres-Gertner concern with information externalities that arise 
                                                                                                                      
 64. Nor in British law, apparently. See KIM LEWISON, THE INTERPRETATION OF 
CONTRACTS (2004). Lewison repeatedly emphasizes that the rules of interpretation are in-
tended to help courts determine the intentions of the parties. See, e.g., id. at 191 (“The can-
ons of construction are no more than pointers to discovering the presumed intention of the 
parties to a written contract.”). 
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because contracting parties can be classified into heterogeneous 
types who attach different valuations to the same product or service. 
 The rules of contract law that are most explicitly concerned with 
information asymmetries are not default rules but interpretive pre-
sumptions, contract formation rules, and—what we have not dis-
cussed so far—immutable rules such as the unconscionability doc-
trine. All of these rules apply regardless of whether there are gaps, 
no doubt reflecting courts’ concern that consumers may fail to under-
stand the transaction even when the contract is detailed, explicit, 
and (relatively) complete.65 
 In sum, two conclusions are worth highlighting. First, there are 
no penalty default rules. Second, rules that seem designed to smoke 
out private information—such as legal formalities, contract forma-
tion rules, and so forth—do not reflect the logic of Ayres and Gert-
ner’s Hadley model. 
IV.   CONCLUSION: WHY ARE THERE NO PENALTY DEFAULT RULES? 
 Let me conclude with some speculation about why penalty default 
rules do not exist. But initially, let me exclude one possibility—that 
the Ayres and Gertner model is in fact wrong. The model and their 
general point are correct: within the confines of the model’s assump-
tions, there may be good reasons for penalty default rules. The ques-
tion, then, is why courts and legislatures have not endorsed this rea-
soning and created penalty default rules. 
 One possible reason is that the Ayres-Gertner model has not yet 
been absorbed into contract theory, but at some future point, after 
the ideas have been taught to enough generations of students, the 
ideas will become a part of the general understanding of contract 
law. Although one cannot know what the future holds, the early judi-
cial response suggests that this will not happen. Indeed, this re-
sponse suggests that the problem with the Ayres-Gertner analysis is 
that it is too complicated and indeterminate for judges to use. 
 Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott have made a similar but more 
general argument about default rules.66 They argue that courts do 
not create default “rules” that are specific enough to have value for 
the parties because the parties have adequate incentives for supply-
ing optimal terms, even with asymmetric information, where signal-
ing and screening mechanisms can be used which, if not perfect, are 
                                                                                                                      
 65. Indeed, the kind of asymmetric information model used by Ayres and Gertner 
does not rely on contractual gaps; it could justify the refusal to enforce explicit terms. See 
Philippe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can En-
hance Efficiency, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 381 (1990). 
 66. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 10, at 594-609. 
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better than anything that courts could produce.67 Although the 
U.C.C. and the common law contain many default “standards,” these 
standards are too vague to provide guidance for parties or courts. If 
Schwartz and Scott are right that courts do not bother producing de-
fault rules and tend to enforce the terms that the parties supply and 
no more, then it would follow a fortiori that there are no penalty de-
fault rules. 
 A final reason that penalty default rules do not exist may be that 
contract law doctrine is not well suited for the types of information 
externalities identified by Ayres and Gertner’s model. Contract doc-
trine is extremely general; it applies in diverse market settings. In-
formation externalities may be much more of a problem in some 
markets—say, insurance markets—than others, and the appropriate 
response may be ex ante regulations oriented to a particular market 
rather than general contract law. For example, insurance markets 
are thought to be especially vulnerable to information externalities, 
and here we have massive ex ante regulation, including price, term, 
and market access regulation. Courts may feel that they should allow 
legislatures to identify information externalities and enact appropri-
ate laws, and that neither common law development nor general 
commercial codes are appropriate for such problems. 
 Indeed, common law courts have been remarkably passive about 
solving contract externalities. Prior to the enactment of antitrust leg-
islation, courts only occasionally interfered with restraints on trade. 
Occasionally citing public policy, courts strike down contracts that 
are not themselves illegal but might further illegal conduct, but here 
legislation comes first and identifies the illegal conduct. Contract for-
malities protect third parties from fraudulent claims that they have 
entered contracts. And tort rules like the fraud doctrine prevent the 
most obvious kind of externalizing behavior. Otherwise, contract doc-
trines tend to enforce freedom of contract; most mandatory rules are 
paternalistic or otherwise inexplicable from a conventional economic 
perspective. Ayres and Gertner’s argument implicitly assumes that 
courts would use general doctrines of contract law in order to deter 
parties from producing subtle information externalities that were 
first identified by economists only thirty years ago. It is more likely 
that the century-old Hadley doctrine, like other doctrines of contract 
law, reflect judicial conjectures about the hypothetical bargain—the 
jointly value-maximizing terms that most parties would want. 
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